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The free energy principle has been proposed as a unifying
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The free energy principle (FEP) states, in a nutshell, that the brain seeks tominimize surprise [1]. It is arguably themost
ambitious theory of the brain available today, claiming to subsumemanyother important ideas, such as predictive coding,
efficient coding, Bayesian inference, and optimal control theory. However, it is precisely this generality that raises a
concern: what exactly does FEP predict, and what does it not predict? Addressing this concern is not easy, because the
assumptions underlying applications of FEP aremalleable (e.g., different applications use different generativemodels,
different algorithmic approximations, and different neural implementations). Moreover, some of these assumptions are
shared with other theories, and some are idiosyncratic; some assumptions are central to the theory, and others are ad
hoc ormade for analytical convenience.
This article systematically deconstructs the assumptions underlying FEP, with the goal of identifying what its
distinctive theoretical claims are. As will become clear, FEP does not have a fixed set of distinctive claims. Rather, it
makes different claims under different sets of assumptions. This is not necessarily a bad thing, providedwe can verify
these assumptions in any particular application and thus render the theoretical assumptions falsifiable.
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2 SAMUEL J. GERSHMAN
Before proceeding, we must address two qualms with this deconstructive approach. Some proponents of FEP
might reasonably argue that identifying distinctive theoretical claims is pointless; the whole point of a unifying theory
is to unify claims, not distinguish them. However, the fundamental issue here is not whether one theory is better
than another, but how to assign credit and blame to different theoretical assumptions. If FEP fails to account for the
data, is that attributable to the assumption that the brain is Bayesian, or a particular algorithmic implementation of
Bayesian inference, or particular assumptions about the probabilistic model? Only by answering such questions can we
understand the successes and failures of a unifying theory, devise suitable tests of its assumptions, and identify ways to
improve the theory.
Another qualmwith this approach is based on the argument that FEP is not a theory at all, in the sense that a theory
constitutes a set of falsifiable claims about empirical phenomena. What makes it a principle, rather than a theory, is that
it constitutes a set of self-consistent statements in a formal mathematical system. In this sense, a principle cannot be
falsified through the study of empirical phenomena. A theory designates correspondences between formal statements
and empirical phenomena, and thus can be falsified if the theory makes incorrect predictions on the basis of these
correspondences. Viewed in this way, FEP is unobjectionable: its mathematical soundness is sufficient demonstration
of its credentials as a principle. Here wewill be concernedwith its credentials as a theory, and therefore wewill pay
particular attention to specific implementations (process models).
2 | THE BAYESIAN BRAIN HYPOTHESIS
As a prelude to FEP, it will be helpful to briefly describe the Bayesian brain hypothesis [2, 3, 4], which can be expressed in
terms that aremore familiar to neuroscientists, and is in fact equivalent to FEP under certain conditions (as elaborated
in the next section). The first claim of the Bayesian brain hypothesis is that the brain is equippedwith an internal (or
“generative”) model of the environment, which specifies a “recipe” for generating sensory observations (denoted by o)
from hidden states (denoted by s ). This internal model may not be represented explicitly anywhere in the brain; the
claim is that the brain computes “as if” it had an internal model. In order for the Bayesian brain hypothesis to have any
predictive power, it is necessary tomake specific assumptions about the structure of the internal model.
There are two components of the internal model that need to be specified. First, hidden variables are drawn
from a prior distribution, p(s). For example, the hidden statemight be the orientation of a line segment on the surface
of an object, and the prior might be a distribution that favors cardinal over oblique orientations [5]. Second, the
sensory observations are drawn from an observation distribution conditional on the hidden state, p(o |s). For example,
the hidden line orientation is projected onto the retina and then encoded by the firing of retinal ganglion cells. This
encoding process might be noisy (due to stochasticity of neural firing) or ambiguous (due to the optical projection
of three dimensions onto the two-dimensional retinal image), such that different settings of the hidden state could
plausibly “explain” the observations to varying degrees. These degrees of plausibility are quantified by the likelihood, the
probability of the observations under the observation distribution given a hypothetical setting of the hidden state.
The second claim of the Bayesian brain hypothesis is that the the prior and the likelihood are combined to infer the
hidden state given the observations, as stipulated by Bayes’ rule:
p(s |o) = p(o |s)p(s)
p(o) , (1)
where p(s |o) is the posterior distribution and p(o) = ∑s p(o |s)p(s) is themarginal likelihood (for continuous states, the
summation is replaced with integration). We can think of Bayes’ rule as “inverting” the internal model to compute a
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belief about the hidden state of the environment given the observations.
The Bayesian brain hypothesis can be naturally extended to settings where an agent can influence its observations
by taking actions according to a policy pi , which is a mapping from observations to a distribution over actions. In the
simplest variant, an agent chooses a policy that maximizes information gain:
I(pi) =
∑
o
p(o |pi)D[p(s |o, pi) | |p(s |pi)], (2)
where o now denotes a future observation, andD denotes the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence (also known as relative
entropy):
D[p(s |o, pi) | |p(s |o)] =
∑
s
p(s |o, pi) log p(s |o, pi)
p(s |pi) . (3)
The expression for I(pi) is equivalent to “Bayesian surprise” [6], and to the mutual information between s and o
conditional on pi [7, 8]. Informationmaximization has been studied extensively in the cognitive psychology literature
[9, 10, 11]. More generally, information maximization can be understood as a form of active learning that has been
studied extensively in themachine learning and statistics literature [12].
Informationgainmaximization is a special caseofBayesiandecision theory,where theutilityu(o) = D[p(s |o, pi) | |p(s |pi)]
of an observation corresponds to information gain. If the observations are valenced (rewards or punishments), then
utilities may reflect their goodness to the agent, who seeks tomaximize the expected utility:
Å[u(o) |pi] =
∑
o
p(o |pi)u(o). (4)
This analysis can be generalized to sequential decision problems [see 13], where an agent’s actions and observations
unfold over time. Typically, the goal in sequential decision problems is tomaximize discounted cumulative utility (return):
R (o) = u(o1) + γu(o2) + γ2u(o3) + · · · (5)
where we have introduced a subscript denoting time-step and the bold notation o = [o1, o2, . . .] denotes the time-series
of observations. The discount factor γ down-weights future utility exponentially as a function of temporal distance. The
expected return under the posterior is then defined analogously to expected utility:
Å[R (o) |pi] =∑
o
p(o |pi)R (o). (6)
In sequential decision problems, an agent needs to trade off gathering information to reduce uncertainty (exploration)
and taking actions that yield immediate reward (exploitation). This means that preferences for informationwill arise
instrumentally in the sequential decision setting; they need not be built explicitly into the utility function.
There are several points worth noting here beforemoving on:
• Although theBayesian brain hypothesis has received considerable support, there are numerous empirical deviations
from its claims (e.g., [14, 15],) some of whichmay be rationalized by considering approximate inference algorithms
[16]. The variational algorithms we consider below are examples of such approximations. We will not evaluate
the empirical validity of the (approximate) Bayesian brain hypothesis, focusing instead onmore conceptual issues
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related to the free energy principle.
• The Bayesian brain hypothesis does notmake any specific claims about the priors and likelihoods of an individual.
Rather, the central claim concerns consistency of beliefs: a Bayesian agent will convert prior beliefs into posterior
beliefs in accordance with Bayes’ rule.
• The Bayesian brain hypothesis abstracts away from any particular algorithmic or neural claims: it is purely a
“computational-level” hypothesis. All algorithms that compute the posterior exactly give equivalent predictions
with regard to the central claims of the Bayesian brain hypothesis, and likewise any neural implementation will
give equivalent predictions. These equivalences do not hold, however, whenwe consider approximate inference
schemes, whichmay systematically deviate from the Bayesian ideal. Wewill return to this point below.
3 | THE UNRESTRICTED FREE ENERGY PRINCIPLE IS BAYESIAN INFERENCE
The basic idea of the FEP is to convert Bayesian inference into an optimization problem (see [17] for a tutorial intro-
duction). This idea was first developed in physics, and later in machine learning, to handle computationally intractable
inference problems. The key algorithmic trick, as wewill see, is to restrict the optimization problem in such a way that it
is not searching over all possible posterior distributions.
Assumewe have available a family of distributions Q (discussed further in the next section), and we can choose one
distribution q ∈ Q to approximate p(s |o). This leads to the following “variational” optimization problem:
q∗(s) = argmin
q (s)
D[q (s) | |p(s |o)]. (7)
The KL divergence is 0 when q (s) = p(s |o). Thus, if p(s |o) is contained in the variational family Q, then the solution
of the optimization problem yields the exact posterior: q∗(s) = p(s |o). This holds true when the variational family is
unrestricted (i.e., contains all possible distributions with support on the hypothesis space).
Algorithmically, this optimization problem is not very practical because to compute the KL divergence we need
access to q (s)—precisely the problemweare trying to solve! However, it turns out that one can reformulate this problem
in a way that is more practical, based on the following identity:
log p(o) = D[q (s) | |p(s |o)] − F[q (s)], (8)
where F[q (s)] is the variational free energy:
F[q (s)] =
∑
s
q (s) log q (s)
p(o, s) . (9)
The free energy is equivalent to the negative of the evidence lower bound, themore common term in themachine learning
literature [18].
Note that the free energy only requires knowledge of p(s |o) up to a normalizing constant, since p(s |o) ∝ p(o |s)p(s).
This is typically unproblematic, since we can often compute the prior p(s) and likelihood p(o |s) of any particular state s .
Critically, the identity above implies that minimizing the free energy is equivalent tominimizing KL divergence, since the
twomust balance each other out tomatch themarginal likelihood, which is fixed as a function of q . Thus, minimizing
free energy when the variational family is unrestricted is equivalent to exact Bayesian inference.
If FEP = Bayes, thenwe cannot distinguish its predictions from other asymptotically correct inference algorithms,
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such asMonte Carlo sampling, except when these algorithms are restricted in someway. Monte Carlo methods may, for
example, be restricted in terms of the number of samples they generate or how they generate the samples (e.g., [19]).
Optimization of free energy is typically restricted by placing constraints on the variational family, as we discuss next.
4 | RESTRICTING THE VARIATIONAL FAMILY
If the hypothesis space is vast, then summing (or integrating) over all possible hypotheses to compute the free energy
will be intractable. Thus, essentially all practical applications of free energy optimizationmake use of a restriction on Q
that renders the optimization tractable (as will be discussed below). The important point for present purposes is that
as long as the true posterior is in Q, the optimal q∗ will be equal to the posterior. Thus, FEP in its most general form is
indistinguishable fromBayesian inference.
Practical applications of free energy optimization restrict Q in someway to make the problem tractable. These
restrictions typically mean that the posterior is no longer contained in Q, and thus the distribution that minimizes free
energy will deviate fromBayes-optimality: q∗(s) , p(s |o).
The widely used “mean-field” approximation assumes that the posterior factorizes across components of s (i.e.,
dimensions of the state space):
q (s) =
∏
i
qi (si ). (10)
For example, if I’m trying to infer the posterior over the height andweight of an individual given their gender, I could
assume that the posterior factorizes into q (height |gender) and q (weight |gender). Because the true posterior rarely
factorizes, themean-field approximationwill produce systematic errors. For example, if the factorization is across a
sequence of states, the posterior may be biased by the order of the data. Intriguingly, these errors can be discerned in
human behavior [20, 21]. On the other hand, themean-field approximationmaywork well in many cases, which is why it
is widely adopted inmachine learning. This effectiveness can render it difficult to test as a process model, because it
oftenmakes similar predictions to exact Bayesian inference.
When s is continuous, another common restriction is to assume that the posterior is Gaussian [22], parametrized
by amean µ and covariancematrix Σ:
q (s) = N(s ; µ, Σ). (11)
These parameters are then chosen tominimize the free energy, typically by gradient descent. The Gaussian approxima-
tion can bemotivated by the “Bayesian central limit theorem,” which states that the posterior is approximately Gaussian
around the mode when the amount of data is large relative to the dimensionality of s . It can also be generalized to
mixtures of Gaussians to approximatemultimodal posteriors [23].
One challenge facing applications of the Gaussian approximation is that the free energy is not, in general, tractable
(except in the case where the exact posterior is Gaussian). To deal with this issue, a common technique, known as
the Laplace approximation, is to use a second-order Taylor series expansion around the posterior mode. This replaces
the nonlinear free energy with a quadratic function, rendering the free energy tractable. The price we pay for this
approximation is that we are no longer optimizing the free energy, and we have no guarantee that this will produce
sensible answers, or even converge. It turns out, however, that the Laplace approximation has intriguing implications for
the neurobiological implementation of Bayesian inference.
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5 | PREDICTIVE CODING
The Laplace approximation can be used to derive arguably themost influential and distinctive aspect of FEP—predictive
coding, according to which feedback pathways convey predictions, and feedforward pathways in the brain convey
prediction errors (discrepancies between data and predictions). The idea of predictive coding has a long history in
signal processing [24], andwas previously proposed as a theory of redundancy reduction (efficient coding) in neural
signals [25]. Friston and colleagues showed how predictive coding could be derivedwithin the framework of free energy
minimization [22, 26, 27], how it could bemapped onto the structure of biologically realistic microcircuits [28], and how
it could be applied tomotor control [29] and action selectionmore generally (a topic we visit in the next section).
Friston and colleagues started from the following assumptions:
• The internal (generative)model is hierarchically structured, such that hidden states at higher levels generate hidden
states at lower levels.
• The approximate posterior factorizes across hidden state dimensions within and between levels of the internal
model (i.e., themean-field approximation).
• Each component of the factorized posterior is modeled as a Gaussian.
They then used the Laplace approximation to approximate the free energy and derive update rules for optimization
based on gradient descent. They showed that this optimization scheme corresponds to a form of predictive coding,
which is found ubiquitously in the engineering literature (e.g., Kalman filtering).
It is important to emphasize that predictive coding is not a generic consequence of FEP, or even of FEP with a
specific approximation family. It is derived from a combination of assumptions about the internal model (hierarchical
organization), the approximation family (factorized and Gaussian), the approximation of the free energy (quadratic
around the mode), and the optimization scheme (gradient descent). With all of these assumptions in place, FEP
doesmake claims that go beyond the general Bayesian brain hypothesis, and have received ample empirical support
[30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. Alternatively, some authors have explored variants of FEP that do not invoke predictive coding, or
combine it with other neural message passing schemes (e.g., [35]).
6 | ACTIVE INFERENCE
Let us return now to the setting in which an agent can take actions (according to policy pi) to influence its observations.
In this setting, FEP posits that the agent seeks to minimize expected free energy under future observations o and future
state s [36]:
∑
o
p(o |s, pi)
∑
s
q (s |pi) log q (s |pi)
p(o, s |pi) = −
∑
o
q (o |pi)D[q (s |o, pi) | |q (s |pi)] −
∑
o
q (o |pi) log p(o |pi), (12)
where q (s |pi) is the approximate belief about future state s prior to observing o . Friston and colleagues refer to the
minimization of expected free energy with respect to actions as active inference. Note that here the likelihood is
stipulated to be p(o |s, pi) = q (o |s, pi), and we have assumed that the predictive posterior q (s |o, pi) ≈ p(s |o, pi).
When the approximate posterior is exact, the first term in the expression is the negative information gain and the
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second term is the entropyH[p(o |pi)] of the future observations conditional on the policy:
∑
o
p(o |s, pi)
∑
s
p(s |pi) log p(s |pi)
p(o, s |pi) = −I(pi) + H[p(o |pi)]. (13)
If in addition observations are deterministic functions of the policy, then the entropy term is 0, andminimizing expected
free energy is equivalent tomaximizing information gain. Thus, under certain conditions active inference is equivalent
to the information gain policy studied in standard Bayesian treatments of information acquisition [10]. When the
observations are stochastic and can be interpreted as reward outcomes (see next section), active inference instantiates a
formof risk-sensitive control, since actions that reduce outcome variabilitywill be favored (see [36] formore discussion).
Another way of thinking about the entropy term is that it reflects the “coding cost” of unpredictable data, since entropy
is a lower bound on the average number of bits needed to communicate observations via a sensory channel without loss
of information [37]. Thus, active inference prefers actions that produce observations which are both informative and
predictable.
As in the previous sections, we can ask which aspects of this analysis are generic implications of the Bayesian
brain hypothesis (with an information gain policy), and which are specific to FEP.We showed that FEP is equivalent to
Bayesian information gain only under the special case of an exact posterior and deterministic outcomes in the future.
When the determinism constraint is relaxed, information gain and expected free energy will be substantively different.
7 | PLANNING AS INFERENCE
A number of papers on active inference make an additional conceptual move (e.g., [38, 39, 36]), reinterpreting the
entropy term as a form of extrinsic value, contrasting it with the epistemic value of the information gain term. Central to
this reinterpretation is the postulate that the utility of an outcome is equal to its log prior probability, u(o) = log p(o |pi),
usually referred to as its prior preference. (Note that we are conditioning on the policy here to emphasize that the free
energy is being computed for a fixed policy.) This leads to a form of planning as inference [40, 41], wherebyminimizing
free energy optimizes a combination of expected utility (extrinsic value) and information gain (epistemic value).
At first glance, this seems rather odd; why should utility be proportional to probability? Undoubtedly there are high
probability events that have low utility (e.g., if you are born into poverty then lacking access to basic goodsmay be highly
probable). However, note that this is potentially just Bayesian decision theory in disguise: as long as I’m allowed to
choose probabilities that are proportional to utilities, FEPwill coincide with Bayesian decision theory. The critical step
in this logic is the assumption that evolution has equipped us with the belief that low utility states are low probability,
due to the fact that if our ancestors spent a lot of time in those states they would be less likely to reproduce. Whether or
not this is a reasonable assumption, the technical point is that planning as inference can be understood as a notational
variant of Bayesian decision theory, provided the utilities and probabilities coincide (free energy theorists typically
stipulate that they coincide). FEP can make distinctive predictions when they don’t coincide, or when the planning
as inference transformation leads to different algorithmic approximations or neural implementations, provided the
utilities and prior preferences coincide (i.e., effectively, replacing utility with prior preferences).
8 | CONCLUSIONS
There are several take-homemessages from this article:
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• For passive observations (no actions), the predictions of FEP are indistinguishable from the predictions of the
Bayesian brain hypothesis when the variational family is unrestricted (i.e., the when the exact posterior is in the
variational family, and henceminimizing free energy is equivalent to exact inference).
• Predictive coding is not a generic consequence of FEP; it arises only under certain restrictions of the variational
family and a specific choice of optimization scheme.
• In the active setting (observations can be influenced by actions), active inference is equivalent to an information
gain policy when the approximate posterior is exact and the observations are deterministic functions of actions.
When observations are stochastic, active inference induces a form of risk-aversion not found in the information
gain policy.
• When utilities are interpreted as log probabilities, FEP corresponds to a form of planning as inference, a class
of algorithms for utility maximization. The predictions of FEP are distinguished from utility maximization when
utilities don’t correspond to log probabilities.1
• When utilities are interpreted as prior preferences, FEP places value on information gain. This also arises naturally
in Bayesian decision theory applied to sequential decision problems and hence is not a distinctive prediction.
These take-homemessages do not exhaust the set of ideas that have been introduced under the banner of FEP. For
example, FEP has been offered as a first-principle account of self-organization [43] and ecological niche construction
[44]. We have focused here on issues that aremore central to neuroscience.
The broader point of this article is that a unifying theory like FEP needs to be deconstructed in order to be properly
evaluated and compared to alternative theories. By undertaking part of this deconstruction, we hope to make the
elegant synthesis offered by FEPmore accessible to the broader neuroscience community.
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